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in association with
However, the transition to the “new donors” 
group did not occur for all of them simultaneously. 
Some countries, such as the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, started ODA activities relatively 
early, i.e. in the mid-1990s, largely due to their 
accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Others, 
such as Romania and Bulgaria, remained on 
the recipient side until the very moment of their 
EU accession in 2007. Thus, the countries do 
not represent a homogeneous group and their 
track records of delivering ODA vary greatly, as 
will be illustrated further. 
These countries’ experiences of delivering 
development co-operation also vary in another 
aspect. Some countries in the group, especially 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia (formerly Czechoslovakia), acted as 
development co-operation providers during the 
communist period. 
This assistance was provided in a different 
context: it was aimed mainly at developing 
countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
From recipients to donors
This publication examines the overall Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) of nine countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 
which acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 
respectively.
The countries on which this report focuses are 
all post-Communist states which, in the past 
20 years, have undertaken deep political, 
economic and social transformations. In the 
transition period they were recipients rather 
than providers of ODA. 
Official development 
assistance framework of the 
countries under scrutiny
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Mongolia, Angola, and other communist 
regimes or regimes inclined thereto, and the 
Cold War context was the main determinant 
of such aid. 
Although this development aid vanished after 
the fall of communism, these countries have 
nevertheless established a certain reputation as 
aid providers, including a track record and a 
network of contacts. This makes it somewhat 
easier for them to engage once again in the 
poorest regions of the world, especially in 
Africa or Asia. 
On the other hand, countries such as Estonia, 
Latvia, and Slovenia do not have extensive 
experience with aid provision, as this policy was 
centralised (either at the USSR or Yugoslavia 
level), and thus they have largely had to build 
up their development policy from scratch.  
Difficulties in meeting 
international commitments 
By joining the European Union, all the countries 
in this report undertook certain commitments 
with respect to the EU development co-operation 
framework, as enshrined in the European 
Consensus on Development, adopted in 2005. 
Because many of the countries had not yet 
completed the transition from aid recipients 
to donors and were still in the “catching up” 
phase in comparison with more established EU 
members, the commitments required of them 
were formulated more leniently, obliging them 
to strive for an ODA to GNI (gross national 
income) ratio of 0.17% by 2010 and 0.33% 
by 2015. 
None of the countries examined have managed 
to meet this obligation, although some of them 
are faring better than others, with Slovenia 
(0.13%) and the Czech Republic (0.125%) 
coming closest to the target ratio in 2011. 
This failure to meet the commitments is usually 
explained by the economic downturn of 
2008/2009. As a result, all the governments 
in the region decided to cut their development 
budgets, exploiting the fact that ODA represents 
the least sensitive area for their electorates. 
This situation is now slowly ameliorating 
as economic performance improves. For 
instance, the Czech development co-operation 
strategy adopted in 2010 pledges to raise the 
development budget by 0.01% of GNI on a 
yearly basis. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic 
is failing to fulfil this commitment. 
The rising importance of 
multilaterally provided 
assistance
Another important implication of the new 
donor countries’ accession to the EU is the 
fact that they had to start contributing to the 
EU and international (United Nations, World 
Bank) instruments of multilateral development 
co-operation, especially the European 
Development Fund, which is decoupled from 
the general EU budget. As the overall amount of 
funds for development co-operation is limited, 
this has largely resulted in a huge rise in the 
multilateral ODA proportion of development 
budgets and a respective drop in the proportion 
of bilateral ODA. 
For instance, while Hungarian bilateral ODA 
represented 51% in 2004, its proportion in the 
Hungarian development budget in 2011 was a 
mere 24%, and in 2008 an even smaller 14%. 
In the case of some countries, contributions to 
multilateral ODA account for as much as 90% 
of development budgets, such as in Latvia. The 
Czech Republic channels around 30% of its 
development budget through bilateral aid, the 
highest proportion from the countries examined. 
Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland also maintain 
a relatively high proportion (Slovakia 25%, 
Hungary 24%, Poland 22%). 
As much as multilateral assistance stems from 
international obligations, the countries have to 
keep in mind that bilateral ODA leaves them with 
greater room for manoeuvre in terms of where 
the aid is directed, thus maximising the added 
value of each donor country’s experience and 
know-how. 
Nevertheless, multilateral contributions are 
predominant in all the countries of the region. 
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Institutional and programmatic 
framework still in the making
Central and Eastern European countries have 
also had to create a legal, institutional, and 
strategic framework which would facilitate their 
assumption of the new donors’ role and enable 
full participation in development co-operation 
policy. The general pattern is that the countries 
with a longer tradition of ODA provision usually 
have a better institutional and programmatic 
framework to deliver development co-operation 
and most of the necessary instruments, including 
strategic as well as individual programmatic 
documents, already in place.
In all the countries examined, the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs (MFAs) assume the major co-
ordinating, strategic and programmatic role 
when it comes to development co-operation. 
However, the execution of development policy 
is often fragmented, with different line ministries 
or other agencies exercising important roles in 
terms of setting priorities, approving projects, 
and disbursing funds. This certainly poses 
huge challenges to the overall coherence, co-
ordination, strategy-setting, and evaluation and 
monitoring of development aid. 
In some cases, however, steps have been taken 
to centralise policy-making and limit the role of 
line ministries, which is a practice common in 
long-established donor countries. The Czech 
Republic has probably gone farthest in this 
respect, limiting the role of line ministries to only 
the provision of scholarships by the Ministry 
of Education and the administration of some 
15% of bilateral international development co-
operation by 2013. 
Two of the countries examined – Czech 
Republic and Slovakia – have established a 
special development agency charged with the 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
bilateral development programmes and projects 
– a practice also common in more established 
donor countries.1 In the case of Poland, the 
Polish Foundation for International Development 
Co-operation can be charged with rather 
1 Czech Development Agency (CRA) and Slovak Agency for 
International Development Co-operation (SAMRS). 
limited tasks in implementing certain projects 
and initiatives related to democracy promotion 
and sharing of the Polish transition experience. 
Another similar decentralised system was 
introduced in Slovenia, where the execution of 
some development projects can be devolved 
to four foundations, functioning at arm’s length 
from the MFA. 
Central and Eastern European countries have 
largely introduced multi-annual strategies 
and programming, which is in line with 
OECD recommendations and international 
best practices and which should deliver 
greater effectiveness by clearly articulating 
geographical as well as thematic priorities of 
development co-operation. 
In the case of Hungary, however, such a 
comprehensive development co-operation 
strategy is missing, which is quite surprising 
given Hungary’s rather long track record as a 
donor country compared to most of the other 
countries of the region. 
In the case of Bulgaria, the legal framework for 
programming is in place, but the documents 
are still in the drafting process. Similarly, in the 
case of Romania, the development strategy 
dating back to 2006 is considered obsolete 
by many stakeholders. Moreover, the Council 
for Development Co-operation, which should 
enhance the coherence of development policy 
at a national level, has not been put in place. 
Geographical focus mainly 
on Eastern Europe and 
Western Balkans
The design of development policy strategy goes 
hand in hand with the challenge of defining 
which geographical areas and territories should 
be targeted.     
For an absolute majority of the nine countries, 
the focus lies either on Eastern Europe (countries 
covered by the so-called Eastern Partnership: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine) or on the Western 
Balkans.
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This policy is explained by several factors: 
historical and existing political, economic and 
social ties, previous experience operating in 
the region, and cultural and linguistic proximity, 
all of which make delivery of development 
assistance easier and more effective. 
This, however, poses at least two challenges. 
The first is a risk of duplication of development 
co-operation delivery. For instance, Moldova 
features as a priority country for all the CEE 
countries bar Hungary. Similar overlaps can be 
found in the case of Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia 
and other Western Balkans countries. The risk of 
duplication becomes even more apparent when 
taking into account the fact that the thematic 
priorities of the Central European countries’ 
ODA are also similar, as will be explained in 
the next section. 
The question is thus whether it would make sense 
to somehow co-ordinate a better division of 
labour among the donor countries. Although the 
development co-operation policy framework is 
created at the national level, and it is naturally in 
the recipient countries’ interest to be targeted by 
as many donors as possible, the actual outcome 
can be counterproductive, and perhaps more 
could be achieved by better focused bilateral 
co-operation from fewer donors.
The second challenge stems from the fact that 
the recipient countries of the CEE group are 
usually upper or lower-middle income countries, 
not the least developed countries. The new 
donor countries’ activities thus seem to go 
against the spirit of the European Consensus on 
Development, whereby the EU should prioritise 
the least developed and lowest-income countries 
and redirect aid especially to Africa. 
Currently, very few countries from the region 
provide development aid to the least developed 
(lowest-income) countries, except for Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.2 
2 Ethiopia and Afghanistan are programme countries of 
Czech bilateral ODA, Kenya is a recipient of Hungarian 
ODA, Poland has as bilateral geographical priorities a 
bunch of low-income countries in East Africa (Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi), and 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan are priority countries of 
SlovakAid.
Afghanistan is an exception.3 
In the case of Hungary in 2011, as much as 
37% of bilateral ODA went to Serbia, which 
is an upper-middle income country. By far the 
largest cumulative recipient of Polish bilateral 
ODA in the 2007-11 period was China, which 
also belongs among the upper-middle income 
economies. 
Although it can be argued that this consideration 
is somewhat less important in light of the relatively 
small proportion of bilateral ODA in the overall 
development budget, it certainly represents 
further food for thought for the Central European 
countries as to possible reconsideration of their 
geographic priorities. 
An overarching problem of these geographical 
priorities is that in most cases they are still too 
broadly conceived, which leaves the rather 
limited development funds scattered across 
many different countries with arguably limited 
impact. For instance, Hungarian bilateral ODA 
was disbursed across 84 countries in 2010. 
Some countries have already opted for a drastic 
reduction in the number of priority countries, 
which should lead to greater effectiveness 
of development aid. The Czech Republic, 
for example, has reduced the number of 
programme countries to five (with five other so-
called project countries), and decided to phase 
out development aid to some countries. 
Thematic focus on transition 
experience and transfer of 
know-how
Apart from articulating geographic priorities, 
the countries of Central Europe have also had 
to define, in line with OECD recommendations, 
the thematic focus of their ODA, maximising 
3 Afghanistan features as an important recipient of ODA 
among many of the Central and Eastern European countries. 
However, this is largely linked to these countries‘ participation 
in international civilian missions in the country or their 
presence in provincial reconstruction teams, which is also 
reported as ODA. This somewhat distorts its picture as a 
systematic recipient or priority of ODA. 
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The only way that the CEE countries can influence 
such trade regimes is through their membership 
in the EU and through the respective decision-
making structures, especially the EU Council. In 
general, the EU has long acted as a champion 
of free trade on the international scene, not least 
because it constitutes the largest trading bloc in 
the world and views trade liberalisation as an 
important incentive for economic development. 
Different types of trade regimes 
with recipient countries
The huge variety of recipient countries 
considered in this study is also reflected in the 
different types of trade regimes that apply to 
them. 
For those recipient countries that are already 
members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), trade is regulated mainly within the 
framework of that organisation, of which all 
the CEE countries are also members. However, 
depending on their relation to the EU, they 
can – and often do – enjoy preferential trade 
relations that go beyond the WTO obligations 
in terms of mutual trade liberalisation. 
Some of the recipient countries have 
concluded, or are in the process of negotiations 
towards, free trade deals with the EU. Such 
agreements provide for the free movement of 
merchandise without tariffs and quotas, thus 
practically liberalising mutual trade. As a form 
of protection for the recipient countries’ markets, 
it is often agreed that trade will be liberalised 
asymmetrically, providing for a faster removal 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on the part of 
the EU. This clause is typical of the association 
agreements between the EU and its southern 
neighbours, and of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements between the EU and 
the Western Balkans countries. 
Most of the countries of the Eastern Partnership 
are in the process of negotiating Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements 
(DCFTAs) that will provide for the removal of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to access to the 
their expertise and added value. All of the 
countries surveyed agree that special added 
value rests in their specific experience related 
to economic, political, and social transition. 
Thus, this “soft” know-how in areas such as 
education, capacity-building, training, and 
technical assistance constitutes the core priority 
of their development aid. 
Different countries accentuate different aspects 
of development aid, e.g. in Estonia the 
creation of e-governance, in Slovenia women’s 
empowerment, and in Bulgaria post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
However, some countries have also identified 
so-called “hard” thematic priorities related 
to their expertise in areas including water 
management and sanitation (Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria), agriculture (Hungary, 
Czech Republic), or economic development 
and infrastructure (Czech Republic, Bulgaria). 
The “hard” thematic priorities often stem from 
previous engagement in such activities in 
developing countries, and are thus more visible 
and present in the cases of countries that have 
already been development aid providers for 
some time (particularly the Czech Republic). 
THE CURRENT STATE OF BILATERAL 
TRADE AND APPLIED TRADE REGIMES 
WITH ODA RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
Since their accession to the EU, the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe generally possess 
very little leverage regarding the trade regimes 
applied to recipient countries. This is due to 
the fact that, as members of the EU, they are 
obliged to follow the trade policy set at the EU 
level. 
1. The development of 
trade relations with priority 
recipient ODA countries
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CEE countries takes place within the EU single 
market or with other developed economies. 
Although in many cases mutual trade indeed 
surged after EU accession, this is likely due 
more to the good economic performance of 
the donor countries, who increased their export 
capacity by attracting more foreign direct 
investment (FDI), as well as to the generally 
low baseline of trade exchange with recipient 
countries. As a result, the mutual trade balance 
often plays in favour of the donor countries and 
exhibits large surpluses on their part. 
The drop in trade turnover seen in many cases 
after 2008-09 illustrates that mutual trade with 
recipient countries depends more on global 
economic trends (economic and financial crisis) 
than on changes in development policy. 
One notable exception to this trend is 
Afghanistan. Development assistance to this 
country is usually linked to the donor countries’ 
participation in peacekeeping and post-conflict 
operations. The donor countries (in our research, 
particularly the Czech Republic and Latvia) 
have exported products in support of these 
missions (such as vehicles, technical equipment, 
medicine and food), which has distorted the 
trade pattern. The phasing out of the missions 
in Afghanistan is likely to result in the level of 
exports dropping again. 
The improvement of mutual trade is also 
hampered by political, economic and 
regulatory instability in the recipient countries. 
Import substitution schemes are also factors 
discouraging business for countries like Latvia 
with, for instance, Ukraine and Belarus. Not all 
Central European countries have a framework 
of export support that would provide their 
companies with incentives as well as guarantees 
(e.g. export risk insurance) to penetrate new 
markets such as the ODA recipient countries. 
While such a system is essentially in place 
in countries such as the Czech Republic or 
Hungary, in other countries export support 
schemes are missing altogether. But even in 
the cases of countries with elaborate export 
strategies or export support schemes, certain 
challenges prevail. For instance, Czech export 
EU market and should also substantially boost 
mutual trade between donor and recipient 
countries.
Those developing countries that have not 
concluded any free trade or similar agreements 
with the EU generally enjoy preferential access 
to the EU market through reduced tariffs 
(Generalised System of Preferences) or zero 
tariffs (GSP+ for countries that respect core 
human rights). In relation to the least developed 
countries, the so-called “Everything but Arms” 
regime is in place, providing for tariff- and 
quota-free access to the EU market. 
The research undertaken in the countries in this 
report4 has shown that most stakeholders are 
generally happy with the current framework 
of trade relations with the recipient countries. 
As many of the recipient countries fall into the 
category of those who have already concluded 
or are in the process of concluding free trade 
agreements, trade is already liberalised and 
relatively little more can be achieved in terms 
of removal of the remaining tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. 
However, there are other important elements 
that can foster mutual trade, which recipient 
countries have more scope for influencing.
Little correlation between 
bilateral trade and provision of 
development assistance
The research has demonstrated that there is 
relatively little evidence that the provision of 
development assistance to a particular recipient 
country is substantively reflected in the volumes 
of mutual trade. 
Most recipient countries are relatively 
unimportant in the donor countries’ trade 
structure. This is so even for neighbouring 
or geographically close recipient countries, 
and can be explained mainly by the different 
structure of their economies. Most of the trade of 
4 For all the country reports, see www.ced.bg and www.
pasos.org
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But the Slovenian case represents an exception 
rather than a rule. In terms of the overall level 
of investments originating from the CEE EU 
members, those directed to their ODA recipient 
countries are still much smaller than those directed 
towards developed countries. Moreover, in 
all the countries examined, practically none 
of the investments were directed to the least 
developed countries but rather to the middle-
income economies of the Western Balkans or 
Eastern Europe. 
All the country reports indicated that investment 
in recipient countries is often discouraged by 
the poor institutional, legal and entrepreneurial 
framework, unpredictable and susceptible to 
change, and messy tax legislation. Political 
instability, coupled with generally high levels of 
corruption and nepotism, is another important 
factor which diverts the attention of potential 
investors. 
In this respect, the countries of the Western 
Balkans and the Eastern Partnership probably 
provide better opportunities for Central and 
Eastern European investors. The EU accession 
process and the Eastern Partnership framework, 
which includes negotiating and concluding 
DCFTAs, make it more likely that such issues will 
be addressed and the regulatory framework 
of these countries will be more stable, thus 
attracting more FDI from Central and Eastern 
European countries.   
Aid for trade
In most cases, aid for trade does not constitute 
an important element of Central and Eastern 
European countries’ development strategies, 
and is viewed as a top-down process due to 
evolving policy at the EU level, with which the 
new donor countries must comply. 
However, due to the fact that the CEE countries 
had to undergo a similar process of induction 
into world trade, the sharing of experience 
relating to integration into international trade 
can represent an important added value in 
these countries’ development policies. 
support institutions have a limited budget and 
do not specialise in supporting export to ODA 
recipient countries, leaving a missing link 
between trade support and development co-
operation. 
Other trade-related activities
All the country reports noted that not only do 
the trade regimes themselves contribute to the 
economic development of the target countries, 
but so do other related issues such as economic 
co-operation treaties, agreements on protection 
of investments, and agreements on the 
avoidance of double taxation, FDI, technical 
assistance related to aid for trade activities, etc. 
Trade treaties are in many cases residual 
contracts concluded with the developing 
countries in the past, often even during the 
Communist era, and in that respect it is doubtful 
whether and to what extent they contribute to 
economic development, given that the donor 
countries have concluded such agreements with 
a plenitude of countries, not only ODA recipient 
ones. 
FDI thus seems to present a better opportunity 
for enhancing economic development in 
recipient countries. The investment creates jobs, 
thus helping to alleviate poverty and also, by 
creating production capacities, generating 
a more diversified export base in developing 
countries. 
However, Central European countries are still 
largely capital recipients rather than investors 
abroad, even though some notable exceptions 
can be discerned. 
Slovenia is one of the most important investors 
in the Western Balkans countries in various 
segments of the economy, and the Czech 
Republic features among the most important 
investors in Georgia, particularly in the energy 
sector. Slovenian investments in four Balkan 
countries (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro) accounted for 
42% of outward Slovenian FDI in 2011. 
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This part of the research project examined the 
role that the private, for-profit sector plays in 
the provision of development aid and, more 
broadly, how it contributes to the achievement 
of development co-operation policy goals 
and objectives in the case of nine countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Among established development aid providers, 
the role of the private sector in development 
co-operation is already taken as a matter of 
fact - in spite of the traditional suspicion of the 
private sector’s participation in development 
assistance as a way of advancing particular 
business interests, rather than contributing to the 
development of poor countries. Indeed, many 
key international documents such as the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, 
the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 and 
the United Nations Global Compact of 2000 
acknowledge the need for business sector 
involvement. 
In the United States, for instance, the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) provided by for-
profit companies amounted to US$ 7 billion, 
roughly one-quarter of the ODA provided by 
the US government. In other Western countries, 
the direct contribution of the for-profit sector as 
a proportion of overall ODA might be smaller, 
but is nevertheless still significant in comparison 
with the involvement of the business sector in the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. 
The research looked at the role of the private 
sector from two perspectives. One angle of 
analysis was the role of the private, for-profit 
sector in contributing to the broader goals 
and objectives of development co-operation 
policy, looking at the activities of companies 
We can find several examples of projects or 
initiatives that can be classified as aid for trade, 
both in its narrow and wide sense, e.g. Hungary 
organised several roundtables convening 
representatives of the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and dealing with 
the issue of elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
Romania launched an initiative aiming at the 
establishment of chambers of commerce in the 
Western Balkans region, although this project 
has been put on hold. 
Poland implemented quite a few projects falling 
within a narrow definition of aid for trade (i.e. 
concerning trade policy and regulations and 
trade development) between 2006 and 2009. 
However, since 2010, no pure aid for trade 
projects have been supported by the Polish 
BDA. 
The main challenges relating to aid for trade 
activities in the new member states are twofold. 
The first is that aid for trade still represents 
an extremely small portion of ODA budgets, 
which – as was already explained earlier – are 
already rather limited in the CEE countries. 
But possibly even more important is the 
challenge of incoherence. CEE countries often 
possess valuable expertise which can indeed 
contribute to recipient countries’ development of 
trade relations and integration into international 
trade. But the link between the development 
policy framework and trade is often missing. 
The relevant authorities often do not realise the 
importance of building institutional and legal 
frameworks, and the private sector is virtually 
unaware of the scheme. Thus, aid for trade is 
often perceived as a way of delivering technical 
assistance in this particular area rather than as 
a part of development policy.
2. The private sector as 
an actor in international 
development co-operation
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Involvement of the private 
sector in the programming 
and evaluation of ODA
When it comes to programming, only the 
Czech Republic officially involves business in 
the planning and evaluation of its development 
co-operation policy. This stems from the fact that 
the Czech Republic is the only country in the 
region that has a formal platform of business 
representatives involved in development 
co-operation, the Platform of Business in 
International Development Co-operation. 
The existence of such a platform obviously makes 
it much easier for the Czech government to find 
a natural counterpart to speak on behalf of the 
business sector (although primarily, of course, 
on behalf of its members only) and contribute 
to the formulation and evaluation of Czech 
development policy.5 The platform also hugely 
enhances the capacity of its members to gain 
in-house knowledge relating to development 
policy and increases the commercial sector’s 
success in bidding for development projects, 
although mainly in the framework of bilateral 
ODA. 
There have been attempts to establish such a 
platform in Poland, but they failed as companies 
were simply not interested in participating. 
The questionnaire survey revealed that, in most 
of the countries, the business sector does not 
have sufficient information on development 
policy, pointing to a lack of access to policy 
documents, and lack of interest and poor 
communication on the part of public authorities 
as the main obstacles. But in most cases, 
companies would be interested to know more 
about the opportunities presented by the 
development co-operation framework and by 
participating actively in shaping it. 
5 The platform was initiated by three big consortia: the 
Union of Industry and Transport of the Czech Republic, the 
Union of Engineering Technologies, and the Association of 
Czech Railway Industries. It currently has 20 members and 
enjoys observer status in the Council for Foreign Development 
Co-operation, the key inter-ministerial co-ordinating body in 
formulating the strategies and priorities of Czech development 
policy.
from Central and Eastern European countries 
in ODA recipient countries and their links to 
development policy aims. 
The other angle analysed the involvement of the 
private sector in a narrower sense by examining 
its role in the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of the development co-operation 
policies of CEE countries and their specific 
participation in both bilateral and multilateral 
development projects. 
Despite the common methodology used for all 
the countries surveyed, the individual country 
reports nevertheless resulted in quite different 
descriptions of private sector involvement, which 
makes comparing them a lot more challenging. 
While some reports analysed the activities of 
the business sector in the recipient countries, 
others focused more on the role and experience 
of the private sector as a development policy 
actor in a classical sense. Furthermore, some 
of the research methods used, especially 
the questionnaire survey among companies 
operating in the ODA recipient countries, 
received a relatively low response rate, which 
raises questions about the representativeness of 
their outcomes. 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR IN ODA ACTIVITIES IN 
A NARROW SENSE
The research showed that in an absolute majority 
of Central and Eastern European countries, the 
role of the private sector in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of development 
co-operation policy is extremely low, if not 
non-existent. Only a very few country reports 
described business sector involvement in the 
delivery of ODA projects: the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. In other reports, it could 
not be always discerned whether the activities 
described as undertaken by the private sector 
actually accounted for participation in ODA 
activities and were financed by the (mainly 
bilateral) ODA budget. 
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development projects profitable. In contrast, this 
has not prevented companies from participating 
in development projects in other countries such 
as the Czech Republic. 
Most of the development aid going into 
infrastructure development and delivery of 
goods and services is not disbursed in the form 
of grants but in the form of tenders (based on 
competition according to the best price offered), 
which means that private companies can still 
make a profit if they can perform the tasks 
more cheaply. This gives further incentives for 
businesses’ involvement and fosters competition. 
An interesting case of incentivising the private 
sector’s participation in ODA delivery is that 
of Slovakia, which conceptualised this in a 
document called Concept of the Involvement 
of Business Entities in Slovak International 
Development Co-operation. The document 
presents measures to foster the private sector’s 
participation in development co-operation, 
including the provision of start-up funds to 
finance initial activities in recipient countries, 
such as assistance in finding local partners, or 
conducting feasibility studies or business plans 
for development projects. 
Other incentives include the possibility of the 
establishment of joint ventures with local partners 
or subsidiaries, as well as the possibility of 
direct participation in projects commissioned 
by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European 
Affairs (MFEA). 
Although this could appear to be an innovative 
approach, it is being contested because it 
provides the business sector with privileged 
access to ODA funding, as such incentives 
(especially the start-up programme) are not 
available to civil society or government 
organisations. The scheme could also 
be in breach of the general OECD DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee) principles, 
which stress the necessity of decoupling support 
for the business activities of companies from 
the donor country from development assistance 
delivered. For this reason, such an approach 
was abandoned by the Czech Republic at an 
early stage. 
Involvement of the private 
sector in the implementation 
of ODA projects 
The generally low involvement of the private 
sector from Central and Eastern Europe 
in development projects is related also to 
the particular nature and structure of the 
development assistance provided by these 
countries. Compared with the ODA provisions 
of rich Western countries with more generous 
budgets, CEE development aid is very limited 
in size and tends to focus on “soft” projects 
such as transfer of know-how, capacity building 
and technical assistance, which are usually 
executed either by government organisations (in 
the case of technical assistance) or civil society 
organisations (in the cases of knowledge 
transfer and capacity building). 
Sometimes, projects relating to capacity 
building and transfer of best practices are 
delivered by for-profit companies, such as in the 
case of Estonia. However, the Estonian example 
represents an exception rather than a rule, as 
the for-profit implementers of such projects are 
performing tasks that would otherwise normally 
be undertaken by NGOs. 
The private sector is more typically involved 
in “hard” projects – for instance, infrastructure 
development and the delivery of particular 
goods or services. These are, however, much 
more costly and thus not so much the focus of 
CEE countries’ development strategies. This 
partially explains why the richer countries of 
the group with a more established development 
policy framework, such as the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia, show a 
higher degree of private sector involvement 
in ODA delivery, as they do finance “hard” 
infrastructure projects which can be delivered 
by private for-profit companies. 
It is striking that Poland, as a big donor in terms 
of overall ODA volume and a country with a 
more established development co-operation 
tradition, does not account for projects that 
could be contracted and executed by private 
companies. This might be because private 
companies often look at maximising their 
profits and do not see how they could make 
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it is difficult to draw conclusions as to the 
main obstacles related to the sustainability 
of private sector involvement. One problem 
acknowledged in the Czech case is that it is 
rather difficult to ensure commercial follow-up. 
For instance, if a project consists of supplying 
certain services or goods to the local authority, 
financed by development funds, the company 
delivering such goods or services expects that 
the delivery might continue and be financed by 
the recipient country or local authority once the 
development funding is finished. However, local 
actors often lack the funds to do so, or another 
donor simply steps in to provide the services 
for free. (This has been mentioned particularly 
in the case of Ethiopia, where a multitude of 
donors makes commercial follow-up practically 
impossible.)
When it comes to participation in multilateral 
development projects (financed, for example, 
by the EU or the World Bank), even Czech and 
Slovak businesses face huge obstacles in terms 
of their capacity. This is due mainly to their 
inability to provide previous references or to 
have sufficient turnover, which is often a formal 
condition for participation in tenders. As a result, 
for instance, Czech civil society organisations 
have been a lot more successful in winning EU 
grants and tenders than businesses. 
This problem is also acknowledged in the 
Estonian report, but is largely attributed to the 
fact that the Estonian administration does not 
lobby sufficiently within the circle of multilateral 
development aid providers. Thus, so far the main 
mode of involvement remains participation in 
international consortia led by more established 
applicants; this is particularly the case in Latvia. 
However, it is quite clear that the participation 
of business in multilateral projects is way below 
its potential across the whole region. 
THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
IN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES’ 
DEVELOPMENT IN A BROADER SENSE
The private sector can also contribute to the 
development of recipient countries indirectly, 
through various activities or operations that are 
As for the number and proportion of development 
projects contracted and implemented by for-
profit companies, very little data is available 
across the region, with the exception of the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Latvia. In the 
Czech Republic, the involvement of the private 
sector is quite robust, accounting steadily for 
the implementation of 45-55% of bilateral 
development projects (in terms of funding). 
In the case of Slovakia, the percentage is 
much lower, oscillating between 24-29% since 
2007, with the notable exception of 2011, 
when the percentage fell to a mere 7%. Slovak 
civil society organisations are thus much more 
successful and important in delivering ODA 
projects. The situation in the Czech Republic 
is more balanced, although businesses tend to 
implement fewer, but higher-budget, projects – 
due to the different nature of projects normally 
implemented by for-profit entities as opposed to 
those executed by NGOs. 
In the case of Latvia, the proportion of business-
executed projects accounts for 19% of bilateral 
ODA projects for the 2005-10 period, bringing 
it closer to the Slovak case. However, Latvian 
private companies engage in different types of 
activities than Czech or Slovak businesses (see 
below). 
In terms of the thematic fields in which the private 
sector participates, it is obvious that these 
are linked mainly to the priorities of bilateral 
development assistance. In the case of three 
countries – Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia – these areas show strong correlation. 
Projects in the realms of water supply and 
sanitation, energy generation and supply, and 
agriculture feature highly in all three countries. 
The situation in Latvia is different; due to the 
different priorities of Latvian bilateral ODA, 
projects include strengthening civil society 
(which sounds a bit paradoxical), capacity 
building, general education, business and 
commercial management training, European 
integration and business environment issues, 
i.e. exclusively “soft” projects. 
Due to the limited information available on 
business participation in development projects, 
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of co-operation with local economic subjects 
as well as low levels of hiring the local 
workforce. (However, it has to be noted that the 
representativeness of the questionnaire survey is 
questionable in all the countries surveyed.) 
This is probably partially explicable by the so-
called “tied-aid” system, which conditions the 
provision of development aid on the supply 
of Hungarian products and services in the 
recipient countries. 
CEE employers in recipient countries often use 
full-time contracts; the use of part-time contracts 
is scarce. In some cases, the use of short-term or 
seasonal contracts has been reported, as in the 
case of Latvian companies operating in Belarus. 
A different situation was reported in the case 
of Slovakia, where the majority of companies 
surveyed use a specific type of service contract. 
Full-time contracts are usually preferred by larger 
companies operating in recipient countries. The 
provision of employment contracts often brings 
additional benefits, such as social and health 
insurance, food vouchers, and in some cases 
schooling and re-qualification. 
However, it cannot be discerned from the survey 
whether these extra benefits are provided 
because it is required by local legislation, or 
they represent benevolence on the part of the 
private businesses operating in the recipient 
countries. 
A factor often identified as an obstacle to 
enhancing the private sector’s capacity to do 
business and invest in recipient countries is the 
credit risk in relation to operations. This problem 
was reported in the cases of Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Estonia. 
In the Estonian case, it was pointed out that 
although a support and guarantee scheme 
exists (provided by KredEx), the procedure is 
too cumbersome and does not cover many 
trade and development sectors, deterring many 
potential investors from operating in recipient 
countries. In the case of Hungary, the tied-aid 
policy makes export credit and insurance highly 
competitive and arguably hampers the larger 
not directly linked to development co-operation, 
but nevertheless can contribute to the same 
goals and objectives. 
The scale of business activities with the potential 
to exert a positive impact on recipient countries’ 
development is wide. The areas cited in the 
reports include trade, investment, public-private 
partnerships, transfer of know-how, infrastructure 
building, human capital development, and 
corporate social responsibility. 
Private entities’ investment in recipient countries 
has a huge potential for enhancing their 
development, as it is directly linked to job 
creation, transfer of technology and know-how, 
hiring of local producers and suppliers, and 
improvement of local infrastructure. However, 
the problem is that many Central and Eastern 
European private entities are hesitant to invest in 
recipient countries for various reasons, including 
political instability, high levels of corruption and 
nepotism, an unpredictable economic and 
legal milieu, different business practices, and 
lack of contacts. 
On the other hand, the fact that many of 
the priority recipient countries are indeed 
geographically, culturally and linguistically close 
somewhat counterbalances this problem. Even 
when it comes to low-income countries, many 
Central and Eastern European countries had 
vivid business contacts with these areas during 
the Communist era. Although these territories 
were largely abandoned in the 1990s, some 
countries, notably but not exclusively Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, are now trying to “re-
conquer” these markets. 
Private sector investment 
and provision of employment 
opportunities
In the absolute majority of the country studies, 
it is evident that the companies that establish 
themselves in recipient countries use the local 
workforce, as well as local suppliers of goods 
and services. The exception is Hungarian 
companies, which display a rather low rate 
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THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS A 
CO-FUNDER OF DEVELOPMENT 
ACTIVITIES
It is also quite telling that the reports do not 
include cases when the private sector would 
act as a funder or co-funder of development 
activities. The Slovenian report mentions the 
fact that the role of the private sector in this 
respect is undervalued, and more could be 
achieved through a closer involvement of the 
private sector in public-private partnerships 
(PPP), whereby businesses would invest some of 
their own funds into development co-operation 
projects. 
This is explicable by several factors. 
Development policy is still relatively new and 
not well anchored in CEE countries’ discourse. 
Private entities are more often than anyone else 
unaware of its goals and instruments, apart 
from a few isolated cases when they participate 
in the implementation of ODA projects and, 
in the sole case of the Czech Republic, also 
in policy planning and evaluation. Even this 
involvement is confined to a relatively small 
group of enterprises, and is not representative 
of the corporate sector as such. This has been 
confirmed by surveys across the region. 
Furthermore, private companies are still mainly 
motivated by generating profit, so engagement, 
let alone funding or co-funding of development-
related activities, would require a kind of mental 
shift on the part of the corporate sector, which 
will be hard to achieve in the short run. 
involvement of the private sector in business 
activities in recipient countries. 
Corporate social responsibility
The research has also shown that Central 
and Eastern European businesses attach 
relatively little importance to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in relation to their business 
activities in recipient countries. If CSR activities 
are implemented, it is often in the form of 
transition investments – for instance, when an 
international corporation invests in a recipient 
country through its branch based in a CEE 
country. 
However, even here some positive examples 
can be found. The Estonian report mentions 
the case of Reet Aus, a fashion designer, who 
helped the largest Bangladeshi fabric and 
garment producer reduce textile waste by 
launching a collection of recycled clothes made 
with a reduced amount of water and energy 
per garment. 
Other examples linked to CSR, although 
indirect, include the Polish branch of BP, which 
in co-operation with Polish Humanitarian Action 
linked its loyalty programme to the provision of 
meals for malnourished children in Africa, and 
Polskie Zdroje, which enabled the construction 
of wells in Southern (now South) Sudan as part 
of its marketing strategy. 
Generally speaking, however, CSR is still 
a relatively new and underdeveloped 
phenomenon in the entrepreneurial scene of 
the CEE region, and thus it is understandable 
that companies do not have a tendency to 
“export” it to other countries. Linking the image 
of the company to its activities in support of 
development in less developed countries does 
not seem to be attractive in some cases, as 
articulated in the Polish report. On the other 
hand, the Czech report states that such activities 
could improve the image of certain companies 
among Czech citizens. 
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from various international donors to participate 
in development projects and to bring global 
issues to the attention of national policymakers 
and publics. 
However, unlike their western counterparts, they 
have to face multiple challenges: a low general 
awareness of global development issues within 
their countries, low levels of comprehension 
as to why their countries should help less 
prosperous countries, underfinancing of the 
sector, and low capacity to perform many of 
the tasks more established development civil 
society organisations take for granted. 
DIVERSITY OF ORGANISATIONS 
ACROSS THE REGION
The NGDO scene across Central and 
Eastern Europe is highly diversified. However, 
several main groups of entities that deal with 
international development co-operation can be 
identified, based on a combination of certain 
criteria. 
The first group of NGDOs is composed of faith-
based organisations. These are traditionally 
engaged in natural and man-made disaster 
relief and humanitarian actions, but their scope 
of operations is not necessarily limited to these. 
Their advantage is that they are usually very 
well connected internationally by having co-
operated with their sister organisations in more 
established donor countries (for instance, Slovak 
charities often started to operate in Africa along 
with Austrian ones). They often operate in 
various areas of the world, beyond the priority 
recipient countries for the region.
Secondly, we find examples of “typical” 
NGDOs that work on a complex set of 
development issues beyond the limited scope 
of their home countries’ priorities, and for 
whom development co-operation is the sole 
or main raison d’être. These organisations are 
more typical for bigger countries of the region 
that also have a more established tradition of 
development aid provision, such as Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and are less 
numerous. In some cases, they are almost on par 
or comparable with their western counterparts. 
This chapter strives to draw a complex 
picture of what role civil society plays in the 
international development co-operation policy 
of nine countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. It is based on individual research 
papers that were prepared in each respective 
country.
THE UNIQUE ROLE OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND 
PARTICULAR CHALLENGES
In all the countries where the role of civil 
society was examined, there is a common 
understanding and recognition that civil society 
is a crucial actor in international development 
co-operation. This fact is acknowledged 
by both civil society itself and government 
representatives. 
This is also standard practice in other developed 
countries, where civil society is usually one 
of the driving forces of development policy, 
participating in policy design and execution, 
education on global issues, and exerting 
effective pressure on governments to increase 
their commitments to developing countries, 
take actions at the global level, or shape 
development policy in one way or another. 
The special importance of non-governmental 
development organisations (NGDOs) in Central 
and Eastern European countries is underlined 
by the fact that they have often been ahead 
of their governments. Such organisations often 
emerged before the countries of the region 
accepted international commitments as donor 
countries. They made use of funding available 
3. The role of civil society 
as a development actor in 
Central and Eastern Europe
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aid. The size varies, which is natural given the 
different sizes of countries and their sectors. 
What is quite striking is that in the case of 
Hungary, which has quite a large and diversified 
NGDO scene, only 16 organisations are full 
members of the Hungarian platform organisation 
HAND, fewer than in much smaller Estonia 
(AKÜ with 21 members) or Latvia (LAPAS with 
30 members). 
In fact, HAND is not the only platform of 
development co-operation organisations in 
Hungary; Hungarian organisations active in 
Africa founded their own platform known as 
the Hungarian Africa Platform, although there 
are some overlaps with HAND. This poses 
questions about the representativeness of this 
platform, and to what extent it could serve as 
an institutional partner to the MFA, given that the 
number of Hungarian organisations engaged in 
development co-operation is much larger (about 
60). 
A similar situation has emerged in the Czech 
Republic, which also has two platforms: one 
of which (FORS) gathers “typical” development 
NGDOs, whilst the other (DEMAS) encompasses 
organisations active in the area of democracy 
promotion and human rights. This is explicable 
by the specificity of the Czech case, where 
democracy promotion and transition activities 
are decoupled from other development activities, 
such as poverty eradication and sustainable 
development. However, these cases are rather 
exceptional. Otherwise the national platforms 
are fairly representative of the development 
sector in the respective countries. 
Most of the development platforms are 
recognised as an institutional partner of the 
administration (especially Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs) in issues relating to development co-
operation. In the majority of cases, they also 
receive some kind of core operational grant 
from the MFA; an exception is LAPAS in Latvia. 
This leads to a paradoxical situation whereby 
LAPAS is competing for funds with its members. 
In the Slovak case, it is also recognised that the 
core grant the Slovak platform receives from the 
MFA is not such that the organisation is free to 
use the funds at its discretion. 
With huge budgets and manpower (e.g. People 
In Need in the Czech Republic and Polish 
Humanitarian Action), they are more successful 
in bidding for international projects, as well 
as very active in influencing the national and 
international evolution of development policy.
 
Thirdly, there is a set of organisations engaged 
in a segment of development co-operation 
typical for Central and Eastern Europe: transition 
experience, using know-how generated during 
the EU accession process and democratic 
transformation. 
These organisations often build on their own 
experience and capacities developed during 
their countries’ transition and are thus capable 
of transferring it to other countries. These 
are usually smaller than classical multi-issue 
development NGOs. They tend to operate in 
areas geographically referred to as the close 
EU neighbourhood, mainly the Western Balkans 
and the ex-Soviet Union, because these are the 
regions where it is assumed that the Central 
European experience is most transferable.
Finally, there are organisations not exclusively 
focused on development co-operation, but 
for whom it represents only one part of their 
portfolio. This is quite a diversified group in itself, 
and typically involves single-issue organisations 
(e.g. gender equality, healthcare) who often 
work nationally as well, organisations engaged 
in global education and awareness raising on 
development issues (working mainly nationally), 
and organisations and think-tanks researching 
development issues. Arguably, this is the 
most typical group of the Central European 
development sector of civil society. 
NATIONAL NGDO PLATFORMS IN 
PLACE IN ALL THE COUNTRIES
It should also be noted that the NGDO sector 
in Central and Eastern Europe is organised into 
national platforms, thus reflecting the practice in 
other EU countries. Such platforms nowadays 
exist in all the countries surveyed. All the national 
platforms are members of CONCORD, the EU-
wide umbrella organisation of NGDOs active 
in development-co-operation and humanitarian 
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into the mid-term review of the Development 
Co-operation Strategy for the 2010-17 period. 
There has also been a movement of personnel 
between the administration (particularly the 
MFA) and the civil society sector, which makes 
mutual contacts and comprehension easier. 
However, when it comes to lobbying at the 
top political level, for instance on issues of the 
overall ODA budget, even FORS recognises 
that its leverage is rather limited. In the case 
of Poland, a regular mechanism of consultation 
was put firmly in place in 2011, following the 
enactment of the international development co-
operation legislation. Civil society also played 
a major role in terms of providing input into 
the bill and currently plays a major role in 
monitoring the system of Polish development 
assistance, the analytical aspect of which was 
greatly expanded in the 2012 report. 
Despite intensified contacts and the passing 
of the international development co-operation 
law, Polish NGDOs highlight that many of 
their criticisms regarding the new institutional 
arrangements were not taken into account. 
The Slovenian NGDO platform SLOGA is 
engaged in the discussion on the formalisation 
and strengthening of the dialogue between civil 
society and government, which was due to be 
formalised in the spring of 2013. 
However, the survey has shown that NGDOs 
across the region still consider their involvement 
in development policy formulation to be 
insufficient with low impact. The feeling is that, 
despite official declarations, they are not treated 
as partners by the government. Underscoring 
this fact is another problem that was mentioned 
in the Romanian and Slovak reports, namely 
the frequent fluctuation of officials dealing with 
development assistance, which makes it harder 
to engage in regular working consultations. The 
difficulties of engaging in policy dialogue are 
also underpinned by the generally low level 
of awareness of development issues among 
policymakers. 
Some of the organisations are involved in 
advocacy activities, mainly at the national 
level, aiming to influence the course of national 
The platform organisations typically provide 
services and capacity building to their members, 
but also engage in educational and awareness-
raising activities nationally, as well as undertake 
advocacy vis-à-vis governments on development 
policy issues. But the considerable internal 
heterogeneity of the platforms, with bigger 
multi-issue organisations as well as rather small 
ones, sometimes makes it difficult to articulate 
a strong position towards the government, thus 
resulting in positions reduced to the lowest 
common denominator. 
In some cases, the emergence of the platforms 
was perceived as more of a top-down 
process (e.g. in Hungary or Estonia, where 
they emerged as a result of capacity-building 
exercises financed by external donors). Thus an 
argument can be made that NGDO platforms 
still need a clearer strategy in terms of what they 
want to achieve, and tangible advocacy goals.
INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY CYCLE STILL INSUFFICIENT
The key role of NGDOs is often recognised 
in the national legislation on development co-
operation, or related strategic documents. 
These describe civil society as a key partner 
in the process of development policy planning, 
implementation and evaluation, and provide a 
framework for its involvement. 
However, as the research has shown, the 
practice varies greatly across the region. While 
in some countries the system of civil society 
input into the policy cycle continues to exit 
mainly only on paper (which is, for instance, 
the case in Bulgaria and Romania), in others 
civil society has provided substantive input into 
policy debates. 
The Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia 
represent the most advanced cases in terms 
of dialogue with the government. The Czech 
platform FORS holds regular consultations on 
major policy documents regarding development 
policy, participates in the Council on 
International Development Co-operation, and 
enjoys very good informal contacts with MFA 
officials. At the moment, it is preparing an input 
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development issues, such as Glopolis and the 
Institute of International Relations, which can 
provide substantive input into FORS’s advocacy 
work.
GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
NOT LIMITED TO THE CLOSER 
NEIGHBOURHOOD
When examining the radius of operations of 
Central and Eastern European civil society 
organisations, the particular development 
policy focus of the CEE governments leads to 
the expectation that civil society organisations 
would be active in the areas of the Western 
Balkans and the former Soviet Union. It is true 
that this area remains the main focal point for 
CEE NGDOs, but it is far from an exclusive 
one. 
For instance, Hungarian development 
organisations have performed projects in 76 
countries across the globe. Similarly, Czech, 
Slovak, and Polish NGDOs have performed 
projects in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. Even organisations in 
smaller countries with little previous experience 
with development co-operation (or contacts with 
the less developed world from the Communist 
era), such as Estonia and Slovenia,6 have been 
active well beyond the EU neighbourhood. This 
shows that the Central and Eastern European 
civil society sector is able to operate beyond the 
“usual suspects” and attract funding from other 
donors besides the national ODA budgets. 
It is mainly humanitarian and disaster relief 
organisations that enlarge the geographical 
scope of operations. For this reason, CSOs from 
countries without a strong tradition or capacity 
for disaster relief, such as Latvia,7 are likely 
6 Estonian NGOs have been active in Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Palestine, Tunisia, 
Nepal, Thailand, Mozambique, Angola, Malawi, Guinea 
Bissau, etc. The survey among Slovenian NGDOs revealed 
that 65% of them undertook activities in Africa and 50% in 
Asia, as opposed to 45% in the Western Balkans and 35% 
in other European countries.
7 According to the Latvian report, there is no organisation 
working in the field of humanitarian aid or disaster relief in 
Latvia.
development policy, mainstream development 
issues in the curricula, or secure more ODA 
funding. International and EU advocacy is not 
very common, firstly as there is a perception that 
it is necessary to focus primarily on domestic 
policy framing, and secondly due to a lack of 
experience or capacity on the part of many of 
the NGDOs. 
On the other hand, some opportunities for EU 
advocacy arise with the rotating Presidency of 
the EU Council. Thus LAPAS has lobbied for 
turning the year 2015 (the Latvian EU Council 
Presidency takes place in the first six months of 
2015) into a European Year of Development 
Co-operation, as the Millennium Development 
Goals will expire then. Increased activity can 
also be traced during the Polish EU Council 
Presidency in 2011, especially through the 
activities of Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH). 
The aim of changing the public discourse 
through advocacy was also mentioned in the 
reports, although it can be assumed that this 
is linked more to awareness raising rather than 
advocacy activities. However, most of these 
advocacy activities are undertaken on ad hoc 
basis, as few organisations have the capacity 
to engage continuously. The Hungarian report 
stresses that for many Hungarian NGDOs this is 
an either/or dilemma: if they decide to engage 
in traditional development, there is no scope to 
engage in advocacy. 
It is not uncommon for advocacy work to be 
performed jointly with, or conferred on, the 
above-mentioned national platforms, which 
seem to possess greater legitimacy speaking on 
behalf of the sector (as in the aforementioned 
case of LAPAS) and better capacities; some of 
them have created permanent posts for policy 
or advocacy officers. Many organisations also 
realise that advocacy has to be substantiated 
with solid and reliable research, so they have 
worked towards increasing their research 
capacities. 
For instance, Grupa Zagranica, the Polish 
national NGDO platform, started to produce 
a regular series of policy briefs, Opinions, 
Debates, Analyses. Similarly, the Czech 
FORS platform gathers think-tanks researching 
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a change in public perceptions through a 
potentially larger spillover effect among the 
young generation, their easier access to 
additional sources of information (especially the 
internet), and perhaps also their more global 
outlook. However, opinion leaders, educators 
and policymakers are also important targets of 
these campaigns. 
The means to raise public awareness about 
development issues vary, and include ad hoc 
media coverage, publication of information 
bulletins and newsletters, and public and 
charitable events. In some cases, examples of 
broader campaigns in support of development 
issues have been accounted for, such as the 
“Czechia against poverty” campaign, which 
is part of the Global Action against Poverty 
campaign, and which employed a variety of 
means, including media coverage, a website, 
and a multitude of related events, supported by 
numerous Czech as well as global celebrities.8 
The global education and awareness-raising 
activities take place mainly at the national 
level, and the research has illustrated that far 
fewer organisations undertake such activities 
in the recipient countries. Notwithstanding 
the importance of these endeavours, it begs 
the question of development co-operation 
efficiency and brings us back to square one in 
terms of the insufficient funding and capacity of 
the majority of CEE NGDOs to deliver classical 
development activities. 
As for actions undertaken by civil society 
organisations in the recipient countries, they vary 
according to the size and scope of operations of 
each organisation. But the general prevalence is 
of educational and training activities, capacity 
building, technical assistance, and transfer of 
know-how, reflecting a more typical regional 
expertise. Issues such as poverty reduction, 
health and sustainable development are far less 
prevalent, and mainly implemented by large 
multi-issue NGDOs, as these can afford to 
establish missions in recipient countries, which 
8 For more information about the campaign, please refer 
to: http://ceskoprotichudobe.cz/en. Among world-famous 
celebrities, the campaign is supported, for instance, by 
Salma Hayek, George Clooney, Penelope Cruz, Antonio 
Banderas or Emma Thompson.
to show a more limited geographical span of 
operations. 
One additional limiting factor is the scarcity 
of diplomatic representation in less developed 
countries. This is becoming challenging even 
for the bigger donor countries, some of which – 
such as Poland and the Czech Republic – are 
closing down their embassies in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This might decrease Polish and Czech 
NGDOs’ appetite to continue activities in 
countries where they no longer can rely on 
their countries’ diplomatic support. Ensuring 
coherence between diplomatic representation 
and development priorities is naturally of 
paramount importance. 
PREVALENCE OF EDUCATION AND 
AWARENESS RAISING AMONG 
CENTRAL EUROPEAN NGDOS’ 
ACTIVITIES
The rather distinct nature of the development 
co-operation discourse in Central and Eastern 
European countries explains why global 
education and awareness raising feature 
high on the agenda of NGDOs. In many of 
these countries, the general public is not very 
receptive or sensitive to, let alone informed 
about, issues such as poverty eradication or 
sustainable development. The mental shift 
from perceiving themselves as poor nations 
and recipients of aid to perceiving themselves 
as members of the rich countries’ club has still 
not taken place in most of these societies. This 
situation has obviously been aggravated by the 
economic and financial crisis. 
For this reason, bringing about a change in the 
prevailingly negative discourse, or the absence 
of global development issues therein, is a 
focus of many of the NGDOs in the region. 
This focus is further reinforced by the fact that in 
terms of financing and human resources it is less 
demanding to undertake these activities than to 
implement complex development projects. 
A large majority of CSOs target their awareness 
raising at young people, where they probably 
see a greater potential for bringing about 
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“virtual” adoptions of children or organisations 
working in Africa (e.g. in Hungary). 
The more established NGOs have developed 
innovative ways of attracting individual 
philanthropy, such as the online sale of products 
from developing countries (such as the Czech 
NGO SIRIRI, which works in the Central African 
Republic), and the increasingly popular address 
of small donors through new social media. 
As for government funding, it also proves to 
be difficult to obtain. Firstly, the overall level is 
relatively small. This creates fierce competition 
for limited funds, often leading to a race-to-the-
bottom approach that forces organisations to cut 
down project budgets. This makes the situation 
especially difficult for small organisations. In 
some countries, such as Bulgaria or Romania, 
development organisations have, at least until 
recently, not enjoyed access to national ODA 
funding at all, relying solely on funding from 
international and private donors. In other cases, 
such as Slovakia, CSOs rely heavily on funding 
from the Slovak government, which makes 
them rather hostage to the official direction of 
SlovakAid. 
Secondly, CSOs in the region often complain 
about the lack of flexibility of government 
funding and the bureaucratic procedures 
attached to it, which makes their lives even 
more difficult. More transparency and 
predictability in the process could definitely be 
envisaged. For instance, a good model would 
be the Project Cycle Manual, published by the 
Czech Development Agency in 2011, which 
sets a uniform methodology and template for 
the preparation, planning, and management of 
Czech bilateral ODA projects. 
Thirdly, the necessity of co-financing for most 
of the government funding for projects often 
represents an insurmountable challenge, 
especially for smaller NGDOs, although this 
problem is even more acute in the case of EU-
funded projects. 
EU funding is often perceived to lie beyond the 
reach of many Central and Eastern European 
NGOs, although in some cases (e.g. the 
is an indispensable condition of more complex 
development projects. However, it cannot be 
discerned whether the training and capacity 
building thematically cover also traditional 
development issues. 
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF LACK 
OF FUNDING AND INSUFFICIENT 
CAPACITY
The research has illustrated that the two major 
challenges for the efficient functioning of the 
civil society sector in development co-operation 
are: 
• the difficulty of accessing funding; and 
• the lack of human capital. 
What explains the underfunding 
of the Central and Eastern 
European NGDO sector? 
The funding survey has shown a dominant 
dependence of most NGDOs on two sources 
of funding: private donations and government 
funding, which together represent the bulk of 
financing for most organisations. Corporate 
funding for development activities is still rare 
across the region owing to generally low 
awareness of development issues among the 
private sector, as something that is very much 
detached from the economic reality of Central 
Europe. Thus private funding in large part 
comes from private foundations based mainly 
in Western Europe, the USA, and other rich 
countries. 
Individual donations are also on the rise, but 
this can be attributed mainly to organisations 
working in humanitarian and disaster relief 
which have been increasingly successful in 
raising funds through SMS donations and 
special donor accounts opened in response 
to natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
floods or tsunamis in various regions of the 
world. Individual philanthropy for classical 
development projects is much less developed in 
the region, apart from a few exceptions such as 
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whereby the huge workload imposed on their 
employees usually results in a loss of motivation. 
NGDO staff often have to engage in all the 
organisation’s activities, from fundraising and 
proposal writing to project implementation 
and reporting, and additional activities such 
as public relations, education, advocacy, and 
awareness raising. 
The Polish report enumerates the ways in 
which organisations try to tackle the issue 
of high fluctuation and burn-out: the use of 
specific incentives tailored to staff needs and 
expectations, a clearer distinction between 
permanent staff and collaborators, and a 
horizontal pay scheme whereby all employees 
are engaged in revenue generation, linking their 
personal situation to the overall performance of 
the organisation. 
Another problem is that many organisations 
cannot afford to keep full-time staff, which 
grossly endangers their long-term viability. Part-
time and especially project-contracted staff are 
prevalent in the cases of most organisations 
surveyed. 
Organisations across the region also rely 
heavily on volunteers in performing their tasks. 
While this is quite normal in the development 
co-operation business, the striking pattern is that 
a large number of organisations use volunteers 
for tasks that should be performed mainly by 
professional staff, such as training and capacity 
building, advocacy, and fundraising. Although 
the use of volunteers is quite adequate for some 
fundraising activities, e.g. collecting donations, 
the research does not account for what kind of 
fundraising activities volunteers are engaged 
in, leading to the distinct possibility that at least 
some of the organisations also use volunteers in 
face-to-face meetings and for project proposal 
writing. 
Some NGOs, however, have developed ways 
of tackling the issue of staff funding. The Polish 
report specifically accounts for two possible 
solutions. One is the so-called “solidarity bag”, 
whereby part of the overheads is transferred 
to a special fund allowing for the payment of 
a basic salary once there are no projects to 
finance the salaries. This model is applicable to 
Czech Republic) the organisations have been 
increasingly successful in EU projects and 
tenders. 
The unattainability of EU funding is attributed 
to two factors. Firstly, many organisations lack 
the capacity to apply for EuropeAid projects 
(because of a lack of project references) or 
the capacity to manage them (because their 
personnel is already overstretched). Secondly, 
there is the problem of co-funding, which is 
required for almost all EuropeAid projects. 
This can often not be secured, which results in 
situations such as when a Latvian NGO had to 
withdraw from a project on increasing women’s 
entrepreneurial capacity in Belarus because it 
could not raise the extra funds. 
An interesting way of tackling this problem 
was introduced in the Czech Republic, and 
could also serve as a kind of good practice. 
The Czech Development Agency reserves a 
certain portion (approximately € 1.1 million) of 
the ODA budget for so-called trilateral projects, 
and the same scheme is in place for democracy 
assistance and transition projects (administered 
directly by the MFA). This means that if a Czech 
NGO succeeds in a EuropeAid tender, it can 
apply for co-funding under the ODA scheme. 
While this partially explains why Czech NGOs 
have been more successful than others in bidding 
for EU funds, the truth is that this funding is not 
automatic (there is an annual call for proposals), 
and in the past two years the amount of funds 
available has been significantly lower than the 
number of proposals, at least under the Czech 
Development Agency calls.
Capacity problems: how to keep 
staff in times of crisis? 
The problems with funding feed into the problem 
with staffing, which endangers the long-term 
sustainability and further growth of NGDOs. 
This problem was reported by an absolute 
majority of organisations surveyed.  
Many organisations pointed to the problem of 
large staff fluctuations and burn-out syndrome, 
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organisations that employ mainly project-based 
staff, but more or less permanently. 
Another solution is a flexible salary, which is 
tied to a uniform rate that can be adjusted 
according to the actual situation and project 
funding, either downward or upward. Another 
good example would be the case of the Czech 
Republic, where the Czech Development 
Agency has a programme of capacity building 
for Czech NGDOs which can finance the 
salaries of permanent staff. 
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